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Abstract:  
The ambiguity in existing empirical work with respect to effects of deposit insurance schemes on 
banks’ risk-taking can be resolved if it is recognized that absence of deposit insurance is rarely 
credible and that the credibility of non-insurance can be enhanced by explicit deposit insurance 
schemes. We show that under reasonable conditions for effects on risk-taking of creditor 
protection in banking, and for effects on credibility of non-insurance of explicit coverage of 
deposit insurance schemes, there exists a partial level of coverage that maximizes market 
discipline and minimizes moral hazard incentives for risk-taking in banking. Using both the 
occurrence of banking crises and non-performing loans in the banking sector as proxies for 
excessive risk-taking the results strongly support this hypothesis in industrial and emerging 
market economies. . Policy recommendations on the country level require analyses of 
institutional factors affecting the credibility of non-insurance. In particular, the implementation 
of effective distress resolution procedures for banks would allow governments to reduce explicit 
deposit insurance coverage and, thereby, to strengthen market discipline. 
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Deposit Insurance Coverage, Credibility of Non-insurance, and Banking Crisis 
 
1. Introduction 
There is widespread consensus among economists that explicit and implicit guarantees of 
depositors, other creditors and shareholders of banks induce banks to take on excessive risk. The 
strongest indication of this so-called moral hazard behavior is the prevalence of banking crises 
across the globe as documented in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). Neither developed nor 
developing countries have been spared, and countries with weak, as well as countries with 
seemingly strong and able banking supervisors have been hit. Supervisors and policy makers also 
seem to consider excessive risk-taking as a result of safety nets for banks a real problem as 
demonstrated by the international efforts since 1988 to create global standards for bank capital 
within the Basel Capital Adequacy framework. This framework has the explicit objective of 
reducing banks’ risk-taking in the presence of strong explicit and implicit deposit insurance 
schemes. 
 The empirical evidence on the relationship between the coverage of deposit insurance 
schemes and risk-taking is ambiguous, as shown in the next section. There are several problems 
facing the researcher analyzing this relationship. Data on risktaking behavior as well as on 
coverage of implicit and explicit guarantees are needed. Behavior cannot be directly observed 
and the riskiness of banks’ portfolios is not easily measured by outside observers. Most 
researchers use indirect measures of banks’ risktaking, such as the occurrence of banking crisis, 
as indicators of excessive risk taking while controlling for a variety of non-behavioral factors 
that contribute to banking crises. Data on explicit insurance coverage often take the form of 
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dummies for characteristics of the deposit insurance system. Implicit guarantees obviously 
cannot be measured directly.  
The approach taken in this paper is that the degree of moral hazard behavior in banking 
depends on the credibility of non-insurance of groups of depositors and other creditors, who are 
not covered by explicit deposit insurance schemes. We argue that the credibility of non-insurance 
determines the degree to which market discipline affects banks’ risk-taking behavior. Thus, it is 
not necessarily the extent of explicit insurance that determines creditors’ and, indirectly, banks’ 
behavior. Absence of explicit insurance is not credible if political realities require supervisors 
and governments to rapidly intervene in banking crises to protect creditors and perhaps even 
shareholders of banks.  
We argue that the credibility of non-insurance of groups of creditors increases with the 
coverage of explicit insurance. Furthermore, the credibility of non-insurance depends on 
institutional factors affecting cost- and contagion effects of having non-insured creditors in case 
there is a major bank failure in a country. The existence of explicit ex ante procedures for dealing 
with a bank in distress in such a way that the risk of contagion effects becomes low is one 
example of institutional factors enhancing the credibility of non-insurance.1 
The approach outlined above leads to the conclusion that the impact of market discipline 
on banks’ risk taking is maximized at a positive level of explicit deposit insurance coverage 
where the non-insurance has a high degree of credibility. At this level excessive risk-taking due 
to moral hazard behavior is minimized. Thus, we argue that there is a U-shaped relationship 
between explicit deposit insurance coverage and excess risk-taking caused by lack of market 
discipline. As mentioned, the level of explicit coverage that minimizes excess risk-taking 
depends on a number of institutional factors. 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Wihlborg (2005). 
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To establish the relationship between explicit deposit insurance coverage and risk-taking 
we employ two proxies for excessive risk-taking by banks. First, we take the occurrence of 
banking crisis as an indication of moral hazard behavior after controlling for a number of factors 
that could cause a banking crisis even if conditions for effective market discipline are satisfied. 
There is an existing literature, emanating from the World Bank in particular, using the 
occurrence of banking crisis as a proxy for excessive risk taking. We use the data employed in 
this literature to be able to compare our results with those in the existing literature.2 Second, we 
take the share of non-performing loans in banks’ loan portfolio as a proxy for excessive for risk 
taking controlling again for a number of non-behavioral factors. The use of two very different 
proxies for excessive risk-taking allows us to check how robust the observed relationship 
between explicit deposit insurance coverage and risk-taking is. 
 We test for the hypothesized U-shaped relationship between deposit insurance coverage 
and banks risk-taking, and the hypothesized effects of institutional factors on this relationship 
using country level data for 140 countries for the years 1985-2003. The countries are divided into 
three groups, developed, developing and emerging market countries. Alternative proxies for 
deposit insurance coverage are used to check for robustness of results. 
        The next section reviews the existing empirical literature on deposit insurance, market 
discipline and banks’ risk-taking. Thereafter in Section 3 the concept of credibility of non-
insurance of banks’ creditors, and the relationship between explicit deposit insurance, credibility 
of non-insurance and risk-taking is discussed. The non-linear, possibly U-shaped, relationship 
between explicit deposit insurance and risk-taking is explained. The impact of countries’ 
institutional characteristics on credibility of non-insurance and thereby on risk-taking is analyzed 
                                                 
2 The data set on banking crises compiled by the World Bank is described in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). This data 
set has been used in much of the literature reviewed below. 
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in Section 4 leading to explicit hypotheses. Methodology and data are described in Section 5. 
Results of the empirical tests are presented in Section 6. The concluding Section 7 summarizes 
the results and possible extensions of the research are discussed. 
 
2. Empirical evidence on deposit insurance, risk taking, and financial crises.  
From a financial stability point of view the objectives of an explicit deposit insurance system are 
to prevent a run on a bank in a situation when depositors are uncertain about the bank’s ability to 
survive, and to prevent contagious runs on other banks by depositors knowing little about the 
banks’ portfolios. In times of crises it is common that explicit guarantees are extended to other 
creditors as well (blanket guarantees) by governments fearing interbank contagion through, for 
example, settlement systems. Explicit depositor protection can also serve a consumer protection 
purpose, and broader creditor protection prevents weak domestic banks from losing 
competitiveness relative to foreign banks by keeping funding costs low. Thereby, shareholders 
are also protected to some extent by blanket guarantees.  
The drawbacks with protection of banks' creditors are also well known. Creditor 
protection in combination with limited liability of shareholders provides the latter with incentives 
to take excessive risk relative to the risk they would take if creditors would monitor banks’ risk-
taking and require banks to compensate them for their perceived risk.3 This moral hazard 
problem can be alleviated through market discipline imposed by creditors. To be effective, 
market discipline of banks’ risk-taking requires that creditors are informed about the riskiness of 
banks’ asset portfolios and that banks’ funding costs thereby come to reflect this riskiness. The 
severity of the moral hazard problem increases as a bank’s Net Worth decreases. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Bhattacharya et al (1993) 
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Adverse risk-taking incentives can be the cause of banking crises and are likely to be 
present in countries with extensive protection of depositors and other creditors. This protection 
can be explicit or implicit. The design of the system protecting banks’ creditors in terms of 
coverage, credibility and speed of compensation influences the incentives of creditors to monitor 
banks’ risk-taking. The weaker these incentives are the greater is the burden on regulation and 
supervisors to control and monitor banks’ risk-taking in order to reduce the likelihood of banking 
crisis. These issues have been discussed by, for example, Cooper and Ross (2002), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), and Cull, et al. (2005). 
These authors also note that the design of explicit deposit insurance systems influences the 
degree to which implicit insurance exists. We return to this issue in the next section.  
There is a closely related literature discussing the relation between explicit deposit 
insurance and costs of banking crises. Hoggarth et al. (2002) summarize potential channels for 
this linkage and the empirical literature is summarized in Angkinand (2005). In this paper we 
focus entirely on banks’ risk-taking incentives as manifested in, for example, banking crises. 
A number of empirical studies address the questions whether the existence and coverage 
of explicit deposit insurance schemes increase the probability of banking crises. In cross country 
analyses Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Hutchison and McDill (1999) use a 
dummy variable for explicit deposit insurance along with a number of variables capturing the 
state of economies to explain the occurrence of banking crises in countries. In the latter paper the 
authors find that the existence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme increases the probability 
of banking crises by approximately 50 percent within a sample of 65 crisis episodes during the 
period 1975-1997. On the other hand, within a sample of 29 developed and developing countries 
during the period 1994-2001, Hoggarth, et al. (2005) do not find a significant general 
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relationship between an explicit deposit insurance dummy and the probability of crises. 
However, when distinguishing between limited and unlimited deposit insurance coverage, they 
find that systems with limited coverage are strongly associated with smaller probability of crises. 
In a larger and updated cross country and time series sample relative to their 1997 paper, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find that explicit deposit insurance with large coverage 
protection significantly increase the likelihood of crises. The coverage features include covering 
foreign currency and interbank deposits, no-coinsurance, where depositors are not required to 
bear risk from their losses due to their banks’ failure, and/or when a deposit insurance system is 
funded ex-post or the source of funding comes from a government4.  
Eichengreen and Arteta (2002) find that an explicit deposit insurance scheme reduces the 
likelihood of banking crises in a sample of developing countries alone. They note that 
differences in result may be explained by differences in the samples of countries and periods. 
When including both developed and developing countries, their findings support Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (2002). The results nevertheless indicate that the observed positive relationship 
between deposit insurance and banking crisis may not be general.    
Chu (2003) uses contingency table analysis to test whether there is an association 
between the system of deposit insurance and banking crises. He finds that an explicit system 
promotes short-run banking stability, but damages the stability in the long run. Of the 36 
countries in the sample, 15 experience systemic banking crises before adopting explicit deposit 
insurance, but successfully avert crises after they introduce the explicit system. However, the 
                                                 
4 They also construct the variable called the moral hazard index, which is found to increase the probability of 
banking crises.  This index is built from the first principal component of deposit insurance features for no-
coinsurance, foreign currency deposits covered, interbank deposits covered, type of funding, source of funding, 
management, membership and the level of explicit coverage. The higher value of this index reflects higher extent of 
moral hazard.   
 8
frequency of banking crises among countries with explicit deposit insurance tends to rise in the 
long-run due to the increased moral hazard associated with deposit insurance.  
Differences in results across countries suggest that implicit insurance of banks' creditors 
vary across countries and that cross country analyses should be refined by taking institutional 
differences into account. For example, the quality of banking supervision, the credibility of 
explicit insurance schemes, and political factors affecting implicit protection differ greatly across 
countries.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) consider the effectiveness of prudential 
regulation and supervision, as well as the strength of the legal system, by allowing measures of 
institutional quality to interact with the deposit insurance variable. They find that the positive 
effect of explicit deposit insurance on the probability of banking crisis is reduced in countries 
with a high level of institutional quality in the mentioned respects. Barth et al (2004) and Cull et 
al (2004) support this view with respect to rule of law but not with respect to prudential 
regulation and supervision.5 Angkinand (2005) analyses the impact of institutional variables such 
as Law and Order, Supervisory Power, and Corruption on the relationship between probability of 
banking crisis and deposit insurance. The variables are included separately as well as 
interactively with explicit deposit insurance coverage. She finds a limited but significant impact 
of some institutional variables standing alone. For example, corruption tends to be positively 
associated with banking crisis.  
The above studies define banking crisis on the country level. The data on banking crises 
by country and year emanates from the World Bank. The criteria for banking crises in this data 
set is described in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who compiled the data from published financial 
sources and interviews with experts.  
                                                 
5 Barth et al employ a new database on bank regulation and supervision described in Barth et al (2001) 
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Banking crises can also be defined on the bank level. There are a number of studies 
analyzing the relationships discussed here on this level. Gropp and Vesala (2001) analyze 
European banks finding that an explicit deposit insurance system is associated with a decline in 
banks' risk-taking incentives. This result contradicts the evidence reviewed above but since only 
European countries are studied and the EU imposed a requirement for minimum deposit 
insurance in the mid 90s, the results cannot be considered robust.  Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2004) take a different approach analyzing bank level interest rates in 30 countries. Deposit 
insurance and bank risk factors independently and interactively are introduced as explanatory 
variables. Explicit deposit insurance reduces interest rates as one would expect. The interaction 
term with banks’ riskiness is positive and significant indicating that bank risk has a stronger 
impact on interest rates when there is explicit deposit insurance. This result can be interpreted to 
mean that explicit deposit insurance contributes to market discipline contradicting much of the 
analysis on the country level. 
Nier and Baumann (2002) set out to test for the impact of market discipline on banks' risk 
taking developing three hypotheses with respect to factors reducing market discipline and 
increasing risk-taking. The three factors are the extent of the government safety net, lack of 
financing by uninsured creditors, and lack of observability of banks' risk choices. Using data for 
729 banks in 32 countries during the period 1993-2000 they analyze banks' risk taking as a 
function of bank capital, market discipline variables, transparency measures and a number of 
country and bank specific control variables. They also consider that banks determine their capital 
ratios and risk taking simultaneously. Risk-taking is measured by the share of non-performing 
loans relative to total loans and provisions for non-performing loans. Market discipline is 
measured by the extent of deposit protection on the country level, the amount of uninsured 
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funding, and the extent of government support on the bank level. The extent of deposit protection 
is captured by the summation of dummies from Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2000). The extent of 
uninsured funding is captured by the ratio between Deposits Due and Total Deposits including, 
for example, Certificates of Deposits. Government support is related to the size of a bank based 
on the Too Big To Fail argument. The results indicate strongly that bank capital is decreasing in 
deposit insurance coverage, increasing in uninsured deposits and decreasing in government 
support. The effects of the same market discipline variables on risk-taking are more ambiguous 
when controlling for effects on capital. Both the variable for deposit insurance coverage and the 
variable for extent of uninsured deposits have effects contradicting the hypotheses. The banks 
that are likely to obtain support because they are To Big to Fail seem be inclined to take more 
risk, however. Thus, lack of explicit deposit insurance and extent of uninsured deposits seem to 
affect risk-taking negatively only through the impact on desired capital while the likelihood of 
government support reduces market discipline both directly and through the effect on desired 
capital.  
The analysis in Nier and Baummann puts the emphasis on the implicit guarantees by 
considering the Too Big to Fail argument and by distinguishing between deposits that have a 
high likelihood of remaining uninsured even in comprehensive deposit insurance systems. 
Although we work with country level data below, we will emphasize implicit guarantees and 
uninsured deposits while also considering that explicit and implicit insurance are not likely to be 
independent.6  
                                                 
6 There is a strand of literature using bank level data focusing on market discipline effects on of uninsured creditors 
of banks. The uninsured creditors are holders of subordinated debt issued by banks. Market discipline is captured by 
the sensitivity of yields to changes in banks’ risktaking, as well as by the effects of changes in yield on bank 
behavior.. For example, Jagtiani et al (2002) have analyzed this issue using American bank data while Sironi (2000) 
studies European bank data. In both cases there is evidence that subordinated debt yields are sensitive to banks 
risktaking while the impact of changes in yield on bank behavior is less clear. Distinguin et al (2005) use banks’ 
stock returns to evaluate whether these data are superior to ratings in predicting distress. 
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3. Credibility of non-insurance and market discipline in banking 
The literature reviewed in the previous section aim at discovering whether risk-taking incentives 
in banks stronger or weaker with expanded explicit deposit insurance coverage. We argue in this 
section that the relationship is likely to be U-shaped such that (excess) risk-taking is minimized 
at positive but partial deposit insurance coverage, and we analyze the conditions for positive and 
negative effects on risk-taking of expanded explicit coverage. 
 Policy makers recognize that banks’ creditors are implicitly guaranteed to some extent. 
They also argue that as long as the guarantees are not explicit there is “constructive ambiguity” 
about the degree to which different creditors of banks will be bailed out in times of crisis. It is 
argued that this “constructive ambiguity” contributes to market discipline. It is possible, 
however, that absence of explicit guarantees leads to strong expectations that governments and 
regulators in times of crises will respond by issuing blanket guarantees of all creditors of banks 
or by bailing them out in other ways. If so, there is no ambiguity and the lack of insurance is not 
credible.  
           Banking crises tend to occur without much warning and, as a result, policy makers must 
react very quickly to stave off any threat to the financial system as a whole and to the payment 
system in particular. Many economists argue that the fear of contagion from one bank’s distress 
to crisis for the banking system as a whole is exaggerated even if the bank has a substantial 
market share.7 However, no government can allow itself to bide the time to see whether this 
hypotheis is correct. If the economists are wrong the costs of a systemic crisis will be politically 
unacceptable. The government and supervisors cannot wait to see whether a large bank is truly 
insolvent or only has a liquidity problem and, in case of insolvency, they cannot allow normal 
corporate insolvency procedures to work themselves out before creditors’ claims are honored 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Benston et al (1986) 
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fully or partially. An important function of the banking system is to supply liquidity and lack of 
trust in the banking system as a whole can rapidly become very costly. Central banks can provide 
liquidity assistance to banks in distress but the difficulty of distinguishing between liquidity-and 
insolvency crises in combination with the fear of contagion tends to compel governments to issue 
blanket guarantees of all creditors or to bail-out the bank through, for example, rapid 
recapitalization.  
  Empirical evidence in Angkinand (2005) indicating that costs of crises are relatively high 
in countries with low explicit deposit insurance coverage indicates that there are strong 
incentives for governments and regulators to react very quickly in times of crises in order to 
reduce crisis-costs.  
One piece of evidence that governments tend to behave as described is that bank 
insolvencies rarely are resolved through formal bankruptcy procedures although corporate 
bankruptcy law applies to banks in most countries. Few countries have a separate insolvency law 
for banks and even if they do, the formal procedures are applied only when the distressed bank is 
very small and the risk of contagion is negligible.8 
    The argument so far implies that absence of explicit deposit insurance is equivalent to a 
strong implicit guarantee of banks creditors and sometimes even of shareholders. Many countries 
have introduced partial deposit guarantee schemes in order to reduce the risk of runs of such 
magnitude that banks must be closed while retaining an element of market discipline. There is 
little empirical evidence, however, with respect to the relation between the coverage of explicit 
deposit insurance and the strength of implicit guarantees of uninsured creditors and the uninsured 
parts of deposits.  
                                                 
8 Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and (1996) review a large number of banking crises and governments responses. 
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 The fundamental arguments of this paper can now be developed more explicitly. These 
arguments are that market discipline requires that the non-insurance of groups of creditors and 
parts of deposits is credible, and that the credibility of non-insurance of those not covered by 
deposit insurance schemes increases as the coverage of explicit insurance schemes expands. The 
greater the coverage of explicit schemes the lower is the probability that governments and 
supervisors must intervene rapidly in distress situations to guarantee the claims of non-insured 
creditors. This reasoning implies that the effect of explicit insurance schemes on the degree of 
market discipline discouraging excessive risk-taking depends on three factors: the coverage of 
explicit deposit insurance schemes, the credibility of non-insurance of those not covered by 
explicit schemes, and the relation between the coverage of explicit insurance and the credibility 
of non-insurance. We argue that the latter relation depends on institutional and political factors 
affecting the costs of having groups of credibly non-insured creditors. 
 The arguments above are illustrated in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis we have the 
extent of explicit insurance coverage (EC) of deposits and other claims on banks. On the vertical 
axis we have the incentives of banks to take excessive risk (RT). We interpret risk-taking (RT) as 
the probability of a bank’s capital buffer being exhausted within a certain timeframe. In other 
words, market discipline is declining and moral hazard incentives are becoming stronger along 
the vertical axis. We distinguish between excessive risk-taking caused by explicit deposit 
insurance (RTExpl) and excessive risk-taking caused by lack of credibility of non-insurance 
(RTImpl). Taking into consideration that credibility of non-insurance depends on the explicit 
coverage it follows that: 
(1) Expl Impl
RT RTRT
EC EC EC
δ δδ = +δ δ δ , where. 
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The line denoted “Explicit” shows how market discipline declines and risk-taking (RT) 
increases as explicit insurance coverage (EC) expands at a constant degree of credibility of non-
insurance. We postulate the following relationship holding the credibility of non-insurance 
constant: 
(2)  Expl
RT
0
EC
δ >δ   and  
2
Expl
2
RT
0
EC
δ >δ   
The second derivative implies that reducing explicit insurance has a relatively strong impact on 
risk taking if the explicit coverage is large, and a weak impact if explicit coverage is small as 
shown in Figure 1. In essence, there are “diminishing returns” in terms of market discipline when 
explicit coverage is reduced. In other words, it is sufficient to have a relatively small group 
uninsured of uninsured creditors to obtain substantial market discipline effects.  
 Turning to the credibility of non-insurance (CNI), this variable is defined as the 
credibility of non-insurance per non-insured dollar. The impact of non-insurance on risk-taking 
depends on CNI as well as the size of the non-insured group (1-EC). In the following no 
distinction will be made between effects of CNI and CNI(1-EC). Their properties are similar9 
and it can be assumed that market discipline effects depend primarily on the existence of a group 
of risk sensitive creditors. The size of this group is likely to be less important.10 
The relationship between explicit coverage (EC) and risk-taking effects of credible non-
insurance is described by the line “Implicit” in Figure 1. This line is drawn under the assumption 
that risk-taking effects of explicit insurance are constant. It is assumed to have the following 
properties taking into consideration that CNI depends indirectly on the effect of the explicit 
coverage on the credibility of non-insurance: 
                                                 
9 It can be shown that the results below with respect to market discipline effects on credibility of non-insurance are 
further strengthened if the since of the groups were taken into account. 
10 Proposals to require banks to issue subordinated debt as part of their capital requirement rely on the same 
assumption. Subordinated debt issues would amount to around two percent of risk-weighted assets. 
 15
(3a) Impl Impl
RT RT CNI
EC CNI EC
δ δ δ=δ δ δ , where 
      (3b) Impl
RT
0
CNI
δ <δ  and 
2
Impl
2
RT
0
CNI
δ >δ  , and   
      (3c) CNI 0
EC
δ >δ  and 
2
2
CNI 0
EC
δ <δ  
The expressions in (3b) state that risk-taking incentives are declining in credibility of non-
insurance, and that increasing credibility has “diminishing returns” in terms of effect on risk-
taking. The expressions in (3c) state that the credibility of non-insurance is increasing in explicit 
insurance coverage, and that increasing the explicit coverage has “diminishing returns” in terms 
of increased credibility on non-insurance. It follows that:  
(4) Impl
RT
0
EC
δ <δ  and that 
2
Impl
2
RT
0
EC
δ >δ  
The derivative in (4) can be derived diagrammatically as well. Figure (2a) shows in the first 
quadrant how CNI increases as EC increases under assumption (3c). The Second quadrant 
describes how risk-taking (RT) is affected by credibility of non-insurance (CNI) under 
assumption (3b). The third quadrant is a 45 degree line transporting RT to the fourth quadrant, 
where the relation (4) between risk-taking incentives and credibility of non-insurance is 
illustrated.       
  Expression (4) is described by the negatively sloping curve denoted Implicit in Figure 1. 
The total effect on risk-taking from increasing explicit insurance coverage (EC) as expressed in 
expression (1) is described by the vertical summation of the curves Explicit and Implicit in 
Figure 1. This summation is shown as the U-shaped curve RT. 
 Although the U shaped relationship described in Figure 1 constitutes the main hypothesis 
to be tested below, it follows from the above discussion that the U-shape as a mathematical 
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necessity requires specific depends assumptions about the second derivatives in particular. If the 
second derivatives for both Implicit and Explicit had the opposite sign the RT-curve would have 
a maximum instead of a minimum. In this case the risk-minimizing deposit insurance system 
would be either no explicit insurance or a blanket guarantee. This would happen, if for low EC-
coverage, the effect of increased credibility of non-insurance would be smaller than the effect of 
increased explicit insurance, and for high EC-coverage if the relative effects were reversed. 
Figure 2a shows two examples of alternative assumptions about the relation between EC and 
CNI. In one case EC does not affect the credibility of non-insurance and, as a result, changes in 
EC will not influence risk-taking through the implicit protection channel. In another case, CNI 
actually falls when EC rises. This case would occur, for example, if political circumstances cause 
explicit as well as implicit protection of banks creditors to strengthen. Risk-taking is 
unambiguously increasing in EC in this case. 
             The impact of specific institutional factors on the relationships described above is 
analysed in the next section.  We conclude this section by stating the first hypothesis based on 
Figure 1 to be tested below: 
Hypothesis 1: Banks’ risk-taking (reflecting strength of moral hazard incentives) depends on the 
coverage of explicit deposit insurance schemes in such a way that risk-taking is relatively high 
for very low and very high levels of coverage, and minimized when there is positive but partial 
coverage. 
      This hypothesis will be tested in Section 6 using two proxies for risk-taking; the occurrence 
of banking crisis in countries, and the share of non-performing loans in loan portfolios of 
countries’ banks.  
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4. Institutional characteristics, the credibility of non-insurance and risk-taking. 
In his section we analyze how institutional factors affect the analysis if credibility of non- 
insurance and risk-taking incentives in the framework of Figures 1 and 2. The institutional 
factors included in the empirical analysis below are Powers of Supervisors, Powers and 
Procedures for Prompt Corrective Action, Rule of Law, Bureaucratic Quality and Corruption.  
The role of regulation and supervision in coping with the moral hazard incentives 
induced by explicit and implicit guarantees of banks’ creditors has been emphasized by policy-
makers as well as many economists.11 In Figure 2 supervisory control of banks’ risk-taking 
affects the relationship between CNI and RT in the second quadrant. Complete control would 
render market discipline superfluous and the relationship in the second quadrant would be a 
straight vertical line. We rather expect that supervisors have only marginal control over risk-
taking. In this case, curve I in the second quadrant in Figure 2b shifts to the right and becomes 
steeper resulting in curve II. This shift leads to a corresponding shift in the fourth quadrant from 
curve I to curve II. In Figure 1 the U shaped curve becomes flatter and possibly lower, since 
strong supervision reduces the sensitivity of risk-taking to market discipline whether induced by 
implicit or explicit insurance. 
It was mentioned above that explicit, predetermined distress resolution procedures for 
banks could enhance the credibility of non-insurance, since such procedures alleviate the need of 
governments and supervisors to quickly guarantee large parts of the banking system out of fear 
of contagion and bank runs. Few countries have such procedures but the United States and a few 
other countries have implemented or discuss implementing Prompt Corrective Action procedures 
(PCA). These procedures reduce the likelihood of crises and allow supervisors to take action at 
                                                 
11  See, for example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) 
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an early stage without having to issue far-reaching guarantees. In Figure 2b the implementation 
of PCA procedures would shift the curve in the first quadrant relating EC and CNI up and the 
shift would be larger at low levels of EC than on high levels. In other words, bank distress 
resolution procedures and PCA procedures are likely to contribute the most to CNI when explicit 
coverage and CNI are low to begin with. Thus, implementation of PCA procedures leads to a 
shift from I to III in the first quadrant and a shift in the fourth quadrant from I to III as well.  
 The impact of PCA procedures in Figure 1on total effects of explicit and implicit 
protection are captured can be derived from the shift in Figure 2b. The curve denoted Implicit in 
Figure 1 shifts down and relatively more at low levels of EC leading to a flatter total curve at low 
levels of EC, a lower amount of risk-taking at the minimum, and a minimum at a lower level of 
explicit coverage. This means that effective PCA procedures that enhance the credibility of non-
insurance enable countries to lower the coverage of explicit deposit insurance schemes in order 
to minimize excess risk-taking. 
 Other institutional characteristics of countries that can enhance the credibility of non-
insurance are the existence of an effective legal system with credible enforcement (Rule of Law), 
an effective and honest public sector bureaucracy and lack of corruption. These characteristics 
are often conceptually interwoven. Rule of law implies that laws and regulation have relatively 
high credibility as they stand; an effective and honest bureaucracy means that the agenda of, for 
example, supervisors do not differ much from a publicly stated agenda, and lack of corruption 
implies that the agenda is not captured by special interests. Thus, all these characteristics are 
expected to affect credibility of non-insurance the same way prompt corrective action does. This 
discussion leads to the second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2.a. Institutional characteristics, such as the existence of Prompt Corrective Action 
Procedures for banks in distress, ex ante insolvency procedures for banks, Rule of Law and other 
characteristic contributing to credibility of non-insurance of banks’ creditors, cause improved 
market discipline, and therefore, a reduction in banks’ risk-taking caused by moral hazard 
incentives.. This reduction in risk-taking is relatively large at low levels of explicit coverage of 
deposit insurance schemes. Furthermore, the minimum level of risk-taking occurs at a lower 
level of explicit coverage. 
Hypothesis 2b: Strengthened supervision and control of banks’ risk-taking caused by moral 
hazard incentives leads to reduced risk-taking and less sensitivity of risk-taking to changes in 
explicit deposit insurance coverage. 
 The remainder of the paper is devoted to testing of Hypotheses 1 and 2 with respect to 
market discipline and risk-taking, and their relationship to explicit coverage of deposit insurance 
schemes and institutional characteristics of countries.  
 
5. Methodology and Data 
Two models are used to test the Hypothesis 1 stating that risk-taking caused by lack of 
market discipline has a U-shaped relationship with the degree of explicit protection of depositors 
and other creditors of banks. First, the occurrence of banking crises is used evidence of excessive 
risk-taking. In this case, a Logit model of banking crises is estimated. The specification is the 
following:  
i,t 2
i,t k k,i,t 1 1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1 i,t 1
i,t
P
L ln x EC (EC )
1 P − − − −
⎡ ⎤= = α +β + δ + δ + ε⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
, where 2
k i ,t 1 1 i ,t 1 2 i ,t 1
i,t i,t 1 i,t 1 i,t 1 ( x EC EC )
1P prob(BC 1| x ,EC )
1 e − − −
− − − − α+β +δ +δ= = = +  
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where BCi,t is a banking crisis dummy variable, which takes a value of 1 in crisis years, 
and 0 if there is no crisis. ln[Pi,t /1-Pi,t] is the odd ratio of the Logit estimation, where Pi,t is the 
probability that a banking crisis occurs, in which case BCi,t equals to 1. The subscript i refers to a 
country and t indicates time. A variable measuring the coverage of explicit deposit insurance, 
EC, enters in the quadratic functional form. Our hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between 
banking crises and the degree of explicit protection is supported if the estimated coefficient for 
the squared term (δ2) is positive and significant, and if the estimated coefficient for the linear 
term (δ1) is negative and significant. The proxies for EC are described below. The proxy for EC 
enters with a lag to avoid a potential simultaneity problem caused by political decisions to adopt 
explicit deposit insurance schemes or alter the coverage limits as responses to banking crises. To 
further reduce potential simultaneity and to check for robustness, we run regressions including 
only the first crisis year within each crisis episode.  
For control variables, x is a k-element vector of macroeconomic and financial variables, 
which comprises the real GDP per capita, the real GDP growth rate, the ratio of money supply to 
international reserves, the ratio of domestic credit provided by banking sector to GDP, the ratio 
of current account to GDP, the inflation rate, and the real interest rate. These are a standard set of 
control variables used in the reviewed literature. By using the same variables, our results become 
comparable to those in the literature where the quadratic relationship is not considered.  
All control variables are lagged one period to avoid potential simultaneity. The pre-crisis 
current account surplus is expected to reduce the probability of crises. The pre-crisis rate of 
inflation, real interest rate, ratio of money supply to foreign reserves, and ratio of domestic credit 
to GDP are expected to increase the likelihood of crises. εi,t is the error term.  
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Banking crises dates and definitions are taken from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), who 
compile the data based on the published financial sources and interviews with experts. There are 
to kinds of banking crises; a systemic banking crisis is defined as the situation when much or all 
of bank capital is exhausted; a borderline banking crisis is identified when there is evidence of 
significant banking problems such as a government intervention in banks and financial 
institutions. We investigate the relationship between the credibility of non-insurance, CNI, and 
deposit insurance coverage, EC, using all crisis episodes, as well as, focusing on systemic crises 
alone. In addition, we divide the sample into three country groups; industrial, developing and 
emerging market countries allowing for different relationships between CNI and EC in within 
the three groups.  
The ratio of bank non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) is used as an alternative 
proxy for excessive risk-taking. In this case, the ordinary least square (OLS) method is employed 
in regressions on the same set of proxies for explicit deposit insurance coverage and the same set 
of lagged control variables. 
2
i,t k k,i,t 1 1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1 i,t 1NPL x EC (EC )− − − −= α +β + δ + δ + ε  
 A relatively reliable set of date for NPL is obtained from the IMF’s Financial Stability 
Reports wherein the IMF has published own measures on the country level since 1997.  
            To test Hypothesis 2 referring to the impact of institutional variables on the relationship 
between each proxy for risk-taking and explicit deposit insurance, the following specification is 
used:  
2 2
i,t k k,i,t 1 1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1 i,t 1 i,t 1 i,t 1 i,tY x EC (EC ) (Institution EC ) (Institution )− − − − − −= α+β +δ +δ +φ × +θ +ε  
 Logit estimation is used when the dependent variable, Yi,t, is a crisis dummy, while OLS 
is used when the dependent variable is NPL. Regressions are run for each institutional variable 
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that enters as a separate variable and squared interacting with the variable EC capturing explicit 
coverage of deposit insurance. Institutional variables include proxies for prompt corrective action 
procedures, as well as for the quality of domestic institutions such as Rule of Law and (lack of) 
corruption. A significantly positive value of δ2 +φ indicates the positive quadratic relationship 
and the curvature is captured by the extent of δ2, φ, and θ.  
The estimation is based on a sample of 140 countries, 21 industrial, 35 emerging market, 
and 84 developing countries, during the period of 1985-2003 when the occurrence of banking 
crisis is used and 1997-2003 when NPL is used. The list of countries is shown in table (1) and 
descriptive statistics are reported in table (3).                
 
Data for Deposit Insurance Coverage  
Three variables of explicit deposit insurance coverage are constructed based on the 
Database of Deposit Insurance Around the World published by Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali, 
and Laeven, (2005), at the World Bank. This database, which is updated from its previous 
version, provides the time-series data for the deposit insurance coverage in each country.  
The first variable, called Covdep, is constructed by assigning a value of 0-3 scale in six 
steps to the variable defined as the ratio between Coverage per Deposit and Deposit-value Per 
Capita from Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005)’s database. This and other variables are described in 
Table 2. A value of 0 is assigned for a country without explicit deposit insurance, a value of 1 if 
a country has explicit deposit insurance with the coverage limit less than 5 times of deposits per 
capita.12 It is assigned values of 1.5, 2, 2.5 when the coverage limit is between [5, 10), [10, 15), 
and greater than 15 times of deposits per capita. If the Coverage to Deposits Per Capital Ratio is 
                                                 
12  Note that even if the coverage limit is several times the average deposit there will be a certain proportion of 
deposits that are not covered completely. The greater the limit the smaller is the share of deposits without full 
coverage. 
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defined as “Full”, the Covdep proxy is assigned a value of 3. The second variable, called 
Covgdp, is constructed in the similar way but it is based on data for the ratio between Coverage 
per deposit and GDP Per Capita (see Table 2).  
The third variable is constructed based on the features of an explicit deposit insurance 
system. This index, called Comprehensive Deposit Insurance, is aggregated from four dummy 
variables as described in Table 2. These dummy variables tell whether foreign currency deposits 
are covered explicitly, whether interbank deposits are covered, whether the system lacks 
coinsurance, and whether there is full coverage dummy13. The value of the Comprehensive 
Deposit Insurance variable, therefore, varies from 0-4, where the higher value indicates an 
explicit system that is designed to comprehensively protect depositors and creditors.  
Tables (4)-(5) explore the frequency of and correlation among these three deposit 
insurance coverage variables. The frequency table 4a suggests that 35.2% of the countries that 
have an explicit deposit insurance system limit the deposit insurance coverage to less than 5 
times of deposits per capita (Covdep), and 67% for coverage limit per GDP per capita (Covgdp). 
Industrial countries are generally the countries with relatively low coverage limits. From tables 
4b-4d, 52.3% of industrial countries limit the coverage to less than 5 times of deposit per capita, 
while only 22.3% and 25.5% of emerging markets and developing countries limit the coverage 
within this range when they have coverage.  
 The frequency tables (the far right tables) show that most explicit systems protect foreign 
deposits (68.9% of all observations) and have no-coinsurance (79% of all observations). Only 
few countries (about 19% of all observations) protect interbank deposits. 13.4% of the countries 
have a full deposit insurance coverage. Industrial, emerging market, and developing countries are 
                                                 
13 The construction of the index by aggregating dummy variables of deposit insurance features follows Nier and 
Baumann (2002)  
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comparable with respect to these features of explicit deposit insurance systems. Considering the 
total score for the Comprehensive DI variable (the third tables from the left), it can be seen that 
all countries with explicit deposit insurance have at least one of the features described.   
            Table (5) shows that Covdep and Covgdp are highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficients vary from 0.71 to 0.86 depending on the group of countries). However, both 
variables are less correlated with the comprehensive deposit insurance (Comp DI) variable, 
suggesting that results of the analysis below may depend on the proxy employed.  
 
Data for Institutional Characteristics 
Testing of Hypothesis 2a require measures characterizing the institutional environment 
and its contribution to credibility of non-insurance. Prompt Corrective Action procedures for 
dealing with banks in distress were emphasized in Section 4 We use data for Prompt Corrective 
Action procedures from the survey database of Regulation and Supervision of Banks around the 
World, compiled by Barth, et al. (2004). The variable Prompt Corrective Action Power (PCP) 
described in Table 2 indicates the existence of a formally specified predetermined level of bank 
solvency for authorities’ to intervene at (1/0), multiplied by the sum of six dummies indicating 
the power of supervisors to resolve the distressed bank’s problems. We also construct an 
alternative index from the survey questions and call this variable Corrective Action and Early 
Intervention (CAEI). As shown in Table 2, this variable is the sum of the dummies in PCP 
according to Barth et al without the multiplication by the dummy for the existence of a formal 
capital ratio for intervention. The reason for not using this multiplicative dummy is that we 
suspect that most countries abide by Basel Capital Requirements whether formally stated or not. 
Another reason is that even if a ratio for intervention is formally specified only the USA has 
clearly specified steps, as well as actions, and actions for increasingly severe intervention. 
 25
Two variables from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are used as proxies for 
the quality of domestic institutions: Rule of Law and Corruption. For each variable, the higher 
value indicates a stronger institutional environment. 
Hypothesis 2b referring to the effects of supervision on banks’ risk-taking is tested using 
another survey variable from Barth et al (2004). Official Supervisory Power (Ospower) measures 
the extent of supervisory authority power in taking actions to influence banks’ risk-taking.  
            The data for economic and financial control variables described in Table 2 are from the 
World Development Indicators, the World Bank  
 
 
6. Empirical Results  
Probability of banking crisis 
 
The first empirical task is to compare results using the linear formulations in the previous 
literature for the relation between banking crisis as a proxy for excessive risk-taking and explicit 
deposit insurance coverage with the quadratic formulation based on Hypothesis 1. Table (6) 
reports Logit regression results for both linear and quadratic relationships for all countries 
between the occurrence of banking crises (BC) and explicit deposit insurance coverage (EC). In 
column (1) there is a simple dummy variable for the existence of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report results for linear formulations with respect to different 
proxies for deposit insurance coverage, while the latter proxies enter quadratically as well in 
columns (3), (5) and (7). In the linear models, the estimated coefficients for an explicit deposit 
insurance dummy and each proxy for explicit coverage of deposit insurance (Covdep, Covgdp, 
or CompDI) are positive and significant at the 1% level. These results confirm those in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Hutchison and McDill (1999), and Barth, et al. (2004). 
 26
 Among the control variables, real GDP per capita and pre-crisis GDP growth have a 
statistically significantly negative relationship with the probability of banking crises. The pre-
crisis ratios of money supply to reserves and domestic credit to GDP, as well as the pre-crisis 
inflation rate are statistically significant and increasing the likelihood of banking crises. The 
results for these variables are quite consistent across different formulations and will not be 
discussed further. 
 Introducing the squared explicit coverage variables we obtain strong support for a U-
shaped relationship between probability of banking crisis and explicit deposit insurance 
coverage. In column (3) the coefficient for Covdep becomes negative while the coefficient for 
the squared Covdep is positive and significant at the 1% level. The results are similar for the 
CompDI proxy. The Wald Chi-square statistics, Pseudo R-square, and the likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that the quadratic estimations have a better fit than the linear ones for these two deposit 
insurance proxies but not for Covgdp. 
         The support for the U-shaped relationship is further strengthened when the sample is 
limited to industrial and emerging market economies in Table (7a). For these countries the 
coefficients for the linear terms are negative and the coefficients for the quadratic terms are 
highly significant and positive for all three proxies for explicit coverage (columns 2, 4 and 6 in 
table 7a). 
        The observation in Section 3 that the relationship need not be U-shaped under all 
institutional arrangements is confirmed within the sample of developing countries in Table (7b). 
The estimated coefficient for the squared proxies for deposit insurance coverage variable are 
negative, which is inconsistent with a U-shaped relationship but consistent with the existence of 
an intermediate level of explicit coverage maximizing the probability of banking crisis.  
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 Before discussing reasons for the differences across country groups the results can be 
illustrated in graphs. Figure (3) shows graphs describing the relationship between the explicit 
coverage proxies and the probability of crisis within the three country groups. Average values for 
all other variables within the sample groups are used when constructing the graphs. The U-
shaped relation is clearly shown for industrial countries and for emerging markets when the 
Covdep proxy is used. For the other proxies there is a positive relation within the emerging 
markets group. For developing countries the relationship has a maximum for the Covdep and the 
ComprehensiveDI proxies. In general the Covdep proxy reveals more curvature because it has a 
larger number of intervals than ComprehensiveDI. It is likely that the definition of Covdep 
resembles the share of deposits being explicitly insured more closely than Covgdp.  
               The curvature was explicitly related to assumptions about second derivatives 
expressing “diminishing returns” in terms of risktaking incentives and credibility of non-
insurance to changes in explicit coverage. The institutional characteristics of developing 
countries do not seem to support the assumptions behind Hypothesis 1. In these countries the 
credibility of non-insurance may not be sensitve to changes in explicit coverage and risk-taking 
incentives may be insensitive to explicit coverage if this coverage is not very credible in the first 
place. Compensation to depositors in case of loss may be slow as well as uncertain. Under these 
circumstances it is possible that the explicit coverage that minimizes the probability of banking 
crisis lies on one of the extremes; no explicit coverage or full explicit coverage (with low 
credibility). 
 In the following we focus on developing and emerging market economies. Before turning 
to institutional characteristics and results for non-performing loans the robustness of the U-shape 
results can be established. For this purpose we consider only systemic banking crises in Table (8) 
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for all countries and for industrial and emerging market countries. The results are very similar to 
those presented above 
 In table (9) we check whether results so far may be affected by simultaneity bias between 
crisis and coverage. In this table only the first year of each crisis is included in the sample. Crisis 
observations for subsequent crisis years are excluded. The results indicate that the significance 
levels of the estimated coefficients for the quadratic terms are higher within the sample of 
industrial and emerging market countries. The lower significance for all countries is also 
consistent with the previous results for developing countries. Thus, Table (9) confirms previous 
results and indications that developing countries should be considered separately. 
 Additional robustness checks refer to the scaling of the Covdep and Covgdp proxies. We 
rescale these two variables to check whether our findings are sensitive to the scales and whether 
the optimal (minimum probability of crisis-) level can be narrowed. This robustness check gives 
similar results and confirms that the optimal level of partial deposit insurance is where the two 
ratios take values between 4 to 5 in the sample of All countries. If a country increases the 
coverage limit beyond this level, the probability of crises will increase at an increasing rate. The 
highest probability of crises occurs not surprisingly when full coverage is implemented but no 
coverage is also associated with a relatively high probability of crisis.   
 Distinguishing between Industrial and Emerging market economies the results suggest 
that in order to minimize the likelihood of banking crises, Industrial countries should maintain a 
slightly lower limit of explicit protection (regardless of whether partial deposit insurance 
coverage is measured by Covdep, Covgdp, or Comprehensive DI) than Emerging market 
economies. For industrial countries, the optimal level for Covdep is one. For Emerging markets 
the optimal level is only slightly higher as shown in Figure 3.  
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Non-performing loans and institutional characteristics    
 We turn now to testing of Hypothesis 2 considering the role of countries’ institutional 
characteristics for the relationship between banks’ risk-taking and deposit insurance coverage. 
Non-performing loans are introduced as an alternative proxy for risk-taking.  
 Tables 10a-10c presents results for regressions exploring the role of institutional factors 
in Industrial and Emerging Market Economies. The dependent variables are the occurrence of 
banking crises (BC) in 10a, the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (NPL) in 10b, and the 
ratio of NPL to bank capital over risk-weighted assets in 10c.14 Results for control variables are 
not included and the Covgdp proxy for deposit insurance coverage has been excluded.  
 A first observation is that the quadratic relationship between risk-taking and explicit 
deposit insurance coverage is confirmed when using NPL as a proxy.15 The quadratic term is 
significant when interacting with institutional variables. The result is stronger for NPL alone in 
10b than for NPL relative to the capital ratio in 10c.  
 The institutional variables are introduced one by one and each model in the Tables 
includes one proxy for explicit coverage (Covdep or Comp DI). The institutional variables 
(described in Table 2) are Prompt Corrective Action Power (PCP) from Barth et al (2004), 
Corrective Action and Early Intervention (CAEI) that excludes the multiplicative dummy for a 
formal intervention trigger, Official Supervisory Power (Ospower), a Rule of Law index (Law), 
and a Lack of Corruption index (Corruption). Each of these variables are standing alone in the 
regressions and they interact with the squared deposit insurance coverage proxy. 
                                                 
14 The NPl data as well as bank capital data are taken from IMF’s Financial Stability reports wherein the data are 
based on “National authorities and IMF staff estimates.” 
15 In regressions with NPL as proxy for risk-taking and excluding institutional variables the quadratic relation 
appears but significant only on a level below 10 percent. 
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  The results show that the estimated coefficients for the interaction between the coverage 
proxy and PCP, CAEI, and Ospower are significant in most regressions. The PCP variable is 
most significant in the banking crises regressions in 10a while CAEI is most significant in the 
NPL regressions. Rule of Law is generally not significant while Corruption has a significant 
effect on banking crises as well as non-performing loans.  
 The magnitude and direction of the effects of these institutional variables on risk-taking 
relative to Hypothesis 2 can be identified most easily in Figures 3a and 3b where predicted 
values from the regressions are plotted for average values of the control variables. The fully 
drawn lines show the relationships without institutional variables while the dotted lines show the 
impact of each of these variables on the two proxies for risk-taking.  
 The impact on the institutional variables on the probability of banking crises appears 
much smaller than the impact on NPL although the coefficients are significant in several cases in 
the banking crises regressions in Table 10a. The hypothesis 2a stating that institutional 
characteristics enhancing the credibility of non-insurance should flatten the slope at low levels of 
deposit insurance coverage and shift the minimum point downwards and to the left is supported 
for CAEI, Ospower, and (lack of) Corruption.  The PCP variable flattens the relationship across 
the range of coverage. It was expected that the Ospower reflecting the power of supervisors 
would have this flattening effect according to Hypothesis 2b. However, it is possible that the 
power of supervisors proxied by Ospower captures the same ability to intervene in distress 
situations as the CAEI variable.  
 As a whole the results lend further credence to the argument that credibility of non-
insurance of groups of creditors enhances market discipline on banks’ risk-taking incentives, and 
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that this credibility is enhanced by institutions that reduce the costs associated with banks in 
distress.  
7. Conclusions 
 
The ambiguity in previous empirical work with respect to effects of deposit insurance schemes 
on banks’ risk-taking and, in particular, on the probability of banking crises can be resolved if it 
is recognized that absence of deposit insurance is rarely credible and that the credibility of non-
insurance can be enhanced by explicit deposit insurance schemes. We showed that under 
reasonable conditions for effects on risk-taking of creditor protection in banking, and for effects 
on credibility of non-insurance of explicit coverage of deposit insurance schemes, there exists a 
partial level of coverage that maximizes market discipline and minimizes moral hazard 
incentives for risk-taking in banking.  
 The empirical results presented here using both the occurrence of banking crises and non-
performing loans in the banking sector as proxies for excessive risk-taking strongly support the 
existence of a partial level of deposit insurance coverage that maximizes market discipline 
effects on banks’ incentives to take excessive risk in industrial and emerging market economies. 
It was also shown that institutional characteristics of countries that enhance the credibility of 
non-insurance reduce risk-taking and lower the “optimal” coverage of deposit insurance 
schemes. The most important institutional factors from this point of view are those that allow 
banks to become distressed and fail without creating serious contagion effects within a country’s 
banking system.  
  The importance of institutional characteristics of countries was borne out by the results 
for developing countries. We found that these countries would maximize market discipline if 
they go to the extremes of either no deposit insurance or full deposit insurance. The reasons for 
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this result could be that stated deposit insurance schemes lack credibility and that changes in the 
coverage of these schemes affect the credibility of non-insurance very little.  
 The hypotheses developed here should be tested on individual bank data as well in order 
to analyze how country characteristics interact with bank characteristics to determine risk-taking 
incentives. Policy recommendations on the country level require analyses of institutional factors 
affecting the credibility of non-insurance of different creditor groups. It seems clear that 
lowering the coverage of explicit deposit insurance system need not generally enhance market 
discipline unless such an action is accompanied by, for example, the implementation of distress 
resolution procedures for banks. Conversely, the implementation of such procedures would allow 
governments to reduce explicit deposit insurance coverage and, thereby, to strengthen market 
discipline. These procedures should allow supervisory authorities to close down a bank without 
fearing contagion effects even when there is no bail-out of creditors across the board. 
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Table (1) List of Countries  
 
Industrial Countries Emerging Markets Developing Countries 
Austria Argentina Albania Kyrgyz Republic 
Australia Brazil Angola Laos 
Belgium Bulgaria Armenia Latvia 
Canada Chile Azerbaijan Lebanon 
Denmark China Bahamas Lesotho 
Finland Colombia Bahrain Macedonia 
Germany Egypt Bangladesh Madagascar 
Greece Estonia Barbados Malawi 
Iceland Ghana Belarus Maldives 
Ireland Hong Kong Belize Malta 
Italy Hungary Bhutan Mauritania 
Japan India Bolivia Mauritius 
Netherlands Indonesia Botswana Moldova 
New Zealand Israel Burkina Faso Mongolia 
Norway Jordan Burundi Mozambique 
Portugal Kenya Cambodia Namibia 
Spain Korea Cameroon Nepal 
Sweden Lithuania Cape Verde Nicaragua 
Switzerland Malaysia Central Africa Niger 
United Kingdom Mexico Chad Oman 
United States Morocco Congo, Republic Panama 
 Nigeria Costa Rica Papua New Guinea 
 Paraguay Cote d´Ivoire Rwanda 
 Philippines Croatia Senegal 
 Poland Czech Republic Seychelles 
 Russia Cyprus Sierra Leone 
 Singapore Dominican Republic Solomon Islands 
 Slovak Republic Ecuador St. Lucia 
 Slovenia El Salvador Suriname 
 South Africa Ethiopia Swaziland 
 Sri Lanka Fiji Syria 
 Thailand Gabon Tanzania 
 Ukraine Gambia Togo 
 Venezuela Georgia Trinidad and Tobago 
 Zimbabwe Grenada Tunisia 
  Guatemala Uganda 
  Guinea Bissau Uruguay 
  Guyana Vanuatu 
  Haiti Vietnam 
  Honduras Western Samoa 
  Jamaica Yemen 
  Kuwait Zambia 
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Table (2) Data Descriptions 
Variable Description Source 
Banking Crisis  The  banking crisis dummy, which is equal to 1 in a banking crisis year (both systemic and nonsystemic banking crises), and 0 otherwise  
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Systemic Banking Crisis  The  banking crisis dummy, which is equal to 1 in a systemic banking crisis year, and 0 otherwise 
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
Nonsystemic Banking 
Crisis  
The  banking crisis dummy, which is equal to 1 in a nonsystemic banking 
crisis, and 0 otherwise 
Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003) 
NPLs The ratio of bank non-performing loans to total loans (%) IMF 
NPLs to capital The ratio of NPLs to bank regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets IMF 
Real GDP Per Capita  Real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$). The data is in 100 U.S.$ WDI 
Real GDP Growth Rate  Real GDP growth (annual %) WDI 
CA to GDP  Current account balance (% of GDP) WDI 
Domestic Credit  Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) WDI 
M2 to Reserve  Money and quasi money (M2) to gross international reserves ratio WDI 
Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI 
Real Interest Rate  Real interest rate (%) WDI 
Explicit Deposit 
Insurance  
The explicit deposit insurance dummy, which is equal to 1 in a year that a 
country has an formal deposit insurance system, and 0 otherwise. 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al.  
(2005) 
Coverage Limit to 
Deposits per Capita 
(Covdep) 
The ordinal data of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage per deposits 
per capita. The value of this variable is assigned based on a value of the 
coverage to deposits per capita. This variable is equal    
=0 if there is no explicit deposit insurance coverage 
=1 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is between  (0,5) 
=1.5 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is between  [5,10) 
=2 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is between  [10,15) 
=2.5 if the coverage to GDP per capita ratio is greater than or equal 15 
=3 if there is blanket deposit guarantee  
Authors’ construction 
Coverage to GDP per 
capita ratio is from 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. 
(2005) 
Coverage Limit  to GDP 
per Capita (Covgdp) 
The ordinal data of the ratio of deposit insurance coverage to GDP per 
capita. The value of this variable is assigned in the same way of coverage 
per deposits per capita.  
Authors’ construction 
(the data of coverage to 
deposits per capita ratio is 
from Demirgüç-Kunt, et 
al., 2005) 
Comprehensive Deposit 
Insurance  
The summation of four dummy variables: 1. whether an explicit system 
covers foreign deposits, 2. whether an explicit system covers interbank 
deposits, 3) whether an explicit system has no coinsurance, and 4) 
whether the full deposit guarantee is implemented (yes=1, no=0).  
Authors’ construction 
(four deposit insurance 
dummies are from 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 
2005) 
Prompt Corrective Power 
( PCP) 
This variable is constructed by summing 6 survey questions relating to 
bank intervention powers (yes=1, no=0). This variable is then multiplied 
by 1 for a country with formally established law that identifies pre-
determined levels of bank solvency deterioration which force automatic 
action such as intervention.  PCP variable is scaled 0-6.  
Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2004) 
Corrective Action an 
Early Intervention 
(CAEI) 
CAEI is the aggregated index of 6 survey questions used to construct 
PCP. This variable captures the extent of supervisors’ prompt corrective 
action and intervention power, but does not consider  the existence of a 
written law on pre-determined level of bank solvency deterioration (see 
section 5)  
Authors’ construction 
(six survey questions are 
from Barth, et al., 2004) 
Ospower 
The official supervisory power variable is scaled 0-16, based on 16 
surveyed questions including 6 questions used to scale the prompt 
corrective action variable 
Barth, et al. (2004) 
Law  The rule of law and order index with the scale of 1-6; high values indicate better quality of law and order. 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Corrupt The corruption index with the scale of 1-6; high values indicate less corruption.  
International Country Risk 
Guide 
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Table (3) Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Banking Crisis  1983 0.1997 0.3999 0 1 
Systemic Banking Crisis  1983 0.1483 0.3554 0 1 
NPLs 453 10.3461 9.0558 0.4 48.6 
NPLs to Capital 428 1.9350 23.5170 -8.4761 486 
Real GDP Per Capita  1983 64.9916 87.5678 0.7474 405.2650 
Real GDP Growth Rate  1983 3.4373 4.5537 -42.4511 38.2007 
CA to GDP 1983 -2.9472 7.9540 -46.6825 43.3987 
Domestic Credit  1983 58.7827 47.2552 -77.3779 321.7523 
M2 to Reserve  1983 8.3928 13.8718 0.1909 147.0156 
Inflation  1983 27.4538 244.9815 -100 7485.4920 
Real Interest Rate  1983 7.5552 17.9792 -99 127.6362 
Explicit Deposit Insurance  1983 0.3701 0.4830 0 1 
The Coverage of Deposit Insurance (All Countries) 
Explicit Deposit Insurance 1983 0.3853 0.4868 0 1 
Covdep 1983 0.6220 0.9573 0 3 
Covgdp  1983 0.5169 0.8007 0 3 
Comprehensive Deposit Insurance 1975 0.6876 0.9960 0 4 
Foreign Deposit Covered  1975 0.2623 0.4400 0 1 
Interbank Deposit Covered 1975 0.0734 0.2609 0 1 
No Coinsurance 1983 0.3006 0.4586 0 1 
The Coverage of Deposit Insurance (Only countries with explicit deposit insurance) 
Covdep 764 1.6145 0.8810 0 3 
Covgdp  764 1.3416 0.7466 0 3 
Comprehensive Deposit Insurance 756 1.7963 0.7743 0 4 
Foreign Deposit Covered  756 0.6852 0.4647 0 1 
Interbank Deposit Covered 756 0.1918 0.3940 0 1 
No Coinsurance 764 0.7801 0.4144 0 1 
Corrective Action and Institutional Quality Variables 
PCP 1662 2.3111 2.5310 0 6 
CAEI 1608 4.1822 1.7094 1 6 
Ospower 1636 10.5339 2.7544 4 14 
Law 1629 3.9391 1.4365 0 6 
Corrupt 1629 3.1147 1.3068 0 6 
Table (4) The Frequency Tables of Partial Deposit Insurance Variables (only countries with explicit deposit insurance systems) 
 
A. All Countries 
 
Covdep  Covgdp  Comprehensive  DI   Comprehensive DI (classified by each component) 
Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent   Scale Frequency Percent 
1 269 35.21  1 512 67.05  1 296 39.15  Foreign 0 234 31.12 
1.5 123 16.10  1.5 94 12.30  2 317 41.93   1 518 68.88 
2 71 9.29  2 12 1.57  3 128 16.93  Interbank 0 607 80.72 
2.5 128 16.75  2.5 12 1.57  4 11 1.46   1 145 19.28 
3 106 13.87  3 102 13.87  NA 4 0.53  No-Coinsurance 0 168 22.11 
NA 67 8.77  NA 28 3.66       1 592 77.89 
            Full Coverage 0 658 86.13 
Total 764 100  Total 764 100  Total 756 100   1 106 13.87 
 
 
 
B. Industrial Countries 
 
Covdep  Covgdp  Comprehensive  DI   Comprehensive DI  (classified by each component) 
Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent   Scale Frequency Percent 
1 161 52.27  1 229 74.35  1 95 30.84  Foreign 0 61 19.81 
1.5 31 10.06  1.5 27 8.77  2 155 50.32   1 247 80.19 
2 27 8.77  2 2 0.65  3 58 18.83  Interbank 0 270 87.66 
2.5 8 2.60  2.5 0 0  4 0 0   1 38 12.34 
3 49 15.91  3 49 15.91  NA 0 0  No-Coinsurance 0 63 20.45 
NA 32 10.39  NA 1 0.32       1 245 79.55 
            Full Coverage 0 259 84.09 
Total 308 100  Total 308 100  Total 308 100   1 49 15.91 
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Table (4) Cont. 
 
C. Emerging Market Economies 
 
Covdep  Covgdp  Comprehensive  DI   Comprehensive DI  (classified by each component) 
Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent   Scale Frequency Percent 
1 57 22.27  1 169 66.02  1 119 46.85  Foreign 0 100 39.37 
1.5 51 19.92  1.5 38 14.84  2 81 31.89   1 154 60.63 
2 37 14.45  2 3 1.17  3 47 18.5  Interbank 0 181 71.26 
2.5 71 27.73  2.5 7 2.73  4 7 2.76   1 73 28.74 
3 32 12.50  3 32 12.50  NA 0 0  No-Coinsurance 0 64 25.00 
NA 8 3.13  NA 7 2.73       1 192 75.00 
            Full Coverage 0 224 87.50 
Total 256 100  Total 256 100  Total 256 100   1 32 12.50 
 
 
D. Developing Countries 
 
 
Covdep  Covgdp  Comprehensive  DI   Comprehensive DI  (classified by each component) 
Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent  Scale Frequency Percent   Scale Frequency Percent 
1 51 25.50  1 114 57.00  1 82 42.27  Foreign 0 77 39.69 
1.5 41 20.50  1.5 29 14.50  2 81 41.75   1 117 60.31 
2 7 3.50  2 7 3.50  3 23 11.86  Interbank 0 160 82.47 
2.5 49 24.50  2.5 5 2.50  4 4 2.06   1 34 17.53 
3 25 12.50  3 25 12.50  NA 4 2.06  No-Coinsurance 0 41 20.5 
NA 27 13.50  NA 20 10.00       1 159 79.5 
            Full Coverage 0 175 87.5 
Total 200 100  Total 200 100  Total 194 100   1 25 12.5 
 
Note: - See section (5) and the table (2) for descriptions of each variable.  
          - NA is Not Available (missing data). For Comprehensive DI (classified by each component), the scale of zero indicates the absence of that deposit insurance feature; the 
frequency of the zero scale also includes the missing data.  
Table (5) The Correlation Matrices of Partial Deposit Insurance Variables (only countries with 
explicit deposit insurance systems) 
 
 
A. All Countries (748 Observations) 
 
 Covdep Covgdp Foreign Interbank Coinsurance Comp DI 
Covdep 1      
Covgdp 0.86 1     
Foreign -0.03 -0.01 1    
Interbank 0.11 -0.14 -0.30 1   
No Coinsurance 0.42 0.29 -0.29 0.22 1  
Comp DI 0.70 0.60 0.19 0.35 0.71 1 
 
 
B. Industrial Countries (362 Observations) 
 
 Covdep Covgdp Foreign Interbank Coinsurance Comp DI 
Covdep 1      
Covgdp 0.78 1     
Foreign -0.16 -0.10 1    
Interbank 0.13 -0.04 -0.12 1   
No Coinsurance 0.26 0.23 -0.23 0.14 1  
Comp DI 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.48 0.56 1 
 
 
C. Emerging Market Economies (254 Observations) 
 
 Covdep Covgdp Foreign Interbank Coinsurance Comp DI 
Covdep 1      
Covgdp 0.71 1     
Foreign -0.21 -0.18 1    
Interbank 0.20 0.06 0.01 1   
No Coinsurance 0.33 0.29 -0.18 0.06 1  
Comp DI 0.37 0.41 0.46 0.55 0.53 1 
 
 
D. Developing Countries (194 Observations) 
 
 Covdep Covgdp Foreign Interbank Coinsurance Comp DI 
Covdep 1      
Covgdp 0.85 1     
Foreign -0.20 -0.24 1    
Interbank -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 1   
No Coinsurance 0.03 0.11 -0.32 0.24 1  
Comp DI 0.11 0.24 0.40 0.59 0.52 1 
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Table (6) The Probability of Banking Crises and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage (All Countries) 
 
Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis Dummy; Estimation Method: Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant -1.4919*** (0.1318) 
-1.5863*** 
(0.1341) 
-1.5304 
(0.1314) 
-1.5185*** 
(0.1298) 
-1.4916*** 
(0.1313) 
-1.4970*** 
(0.1304) 
-1.4862*** 
(0.1326) 
Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0058*** (0.0011) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0058*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0057*** 
(0.0011) 
Real GDP Growth t-1 
-0.0789*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0767*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0741*** 
(0.0127) 
-0.0771*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0761*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.0778*** 
(0.0130) 
-0.0775*** 
(0.0130) 
CA to GDP t-1 
0.0058 
(0.0081) 
-0.0003 
(0.0080) 
-0.0030 
(0.0078) 
-0.0018 
(0.0078) 
-0.0023 
(0.0078) 
0.0051 
(0.0080) 
0.0052 
(0.0080) 
Domestic Credit t-1  
0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
0.0040** 
(0.0018) 
0.0043** 
(0.0017) 
0.0035** 
(0.0018) 
0.0035** 
(0.0018) 
0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
0.0038** 
(0.0019) 
M2 to Reserve t-1  
0.0124*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0137*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0122*** 
(0.0039) 
Inflation t-1  
0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0003) 
Real Interest Rate t-1  
0.0058* 
(0.0034) 
0.0033 
(0.0034) 
0.0017 
(0.0033) 
0.0029 
(0.0034) 
0.0024 
(0.0034) 
0.0045 
(0.0033) 
0.0043 
(0.0033) 
Explicit DI t-1  
0.7587*** 
(0.1302)       
Covdep t-1  
0.5089*** 
(0.0604) 
-0.4157* 
(0.2186)     
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1   
0.3558*** 
(0.0806)     
Covgdp t-1    
0.6223** 
(0.0763) 
0.4188** 
(0.1954)   
(Covgdp × Covgdp) t-1     
0.0789 
(0.0688)   
Comp DI      0.4103*** (0.0596) 
-0.3215* 
(0.189)7 
(Comp DI×Comp DI) t-1       
0.0323 
(0.0658) 
No. of observations 1983 1983 1983 1983 1983 1979 1979 
% correctly predicted 80.58% 80.74% 80.64% 80.58% 80.48% 80.85% 80.80% 
Wald Chi-Square  106.17 147.59 169.70 140.43 142.46 123.95 124.70 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0600 0.0788 0.0885 0.0773 0.0779 0.0661 0.0662 
Log-Likelihood -931.97 -913.34 -903.68 -914.87 -914.21 -919.94 -919.81 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors of estimated 
coefficients.  
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Table (7) The Probability of Banking Crises and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage Classified for 
Industrial, Emerging Market, and Developing Countries  
Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis Dummy; Estimation Method: Logit Model 
 
Table (7a) Industrial and Emerging Market Countries 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -1.3942*** (0.2590) 
-1.0586*** 
(0.2692) 
-1.2371*** 
(0.2410) 
-0.9103*** 
(0.2646) 
-1.2937*** 
(0.2477) 
-1.0738*** 
(0.2605) 
Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0059*** (0.0012) 
-0.0056*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0064*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0061*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0062*** 
(0.0012) 
-0.0055*** 
(0.0012) 
Real GDP Growth t-1 
-0.1315*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.1379*** 
(0.0239) 
-0.1366*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.1395*** 
(0.0237) 
-0.1331*** 
(0.0236) 
-0.1348*** 
(0.0236) 
CA to GDP t-1 
-0.0295 
(0.0205) 
-0.0331 
(0.0209) 
-0.0360* 
(0.0204) 
-0.0389* 
(0.0206) 
-0.0261 
(0.0203) 
-0.0259 
(0.0204) 
Domestic Credit t-1  
0.0100*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0090*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0091*** 
(0.0023) 
0.0076*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0101*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0096*** 
(0.0025) 
M2 to Reserve t-1  
-0.0127 
(0.0111) 
-0.0032 
(0.0115) 
-0.0099 
(0.0112) 
-0.0018 
(0.0113) 
-0.0195* 
(0.0114) 
-0.0206* 
(0.0119) 
Inflation t-1  
-0.0041*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0044*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0054*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0045*** 
(0.0015) 
Real Interest Rate t-1  
-0.0004 
(0.0054) 
-0.0041 
(0.0054) 
-0.0011 
(0.0054) 
-0.0039 
(0.0056) 
0.0008 
(0.0054) 
-0.0013 
(0.0054) 
Covdep t-1 
0.4607*** 
(0.0906) 
-1.0564*** 
(0.2814)     
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1  
0.5595*** 
(0.0976)     
Covgdp t-1   
0.5268*** 
(0.1044) 
-0.3613 
(0.2765)   
(Covgdp × Covgdp) t-1    
0.3204*** 
(0.0896)   
Comp DI t-1     
0.4022*** 
(0.0876) 
-0.3421 
(0.2694) 
(Comp DI × Comp DI) t-1      
0.2599*** 
(0.0901) 
No. of observations 869 869 869 869 869 869 
% correctly predicted 78.83% 79.75% 79.17% 79.63% 78.37% 78.25% 
Wald Chi-Square  91.85 118.25 87.95 98.47 87.59 90.36 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0972 0.1313 0.0932 0.1069 0.0898 0.0999 
Log-Likelihood -412.03 -405.13 -422.88 -416.52 -424.49 -419.79 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors of estimated 
coefficients.  
 
Table (7b) Industrial, Emerging Market, and Developing Countries 
 
 Industrial Countries Emerging Market Economies Developing Countries 
Constant -4.0118*** (0.7381) 
-4.2355*** 
(0.7783) 
-3.7808*** 
(0.7742) 
-0.1212 
(0.3751) 
-0.0680 
(0.3738) 
-0.5886 
(0.3873) 
-1.1245*** 
(0.1727) 
-1.1169 
(0.1724) 
-1.0552*** 
(0.1718) 
Real GDP Per Capita  0.0068** (0.0033) 
0.0084*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0071** 
(0.0031) 
-0.0166*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.0167*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0141*** 
(0.0033) 
-0.0265*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0282 
(0.0054) 
-0.0312*** 
(0.0065) 
Real GDP Growth t-1  
-0.3203*** 
(0.0926) 
-0.3095*** 
(0.0875) 
-0.3353*** 
(0.0860) 
-0.1100*** 
(0.0253) 
-0.1176*** 
(0.0255) 
-0.1063*** 
(0.0247) 
-0.0708*** 
(0.0166) 
-0.0728 
(0.0170) 
-0.0722*** 
(0.0170) 
CA to GDP t-1 
-0.1746*** 
(0.0507) 
-0.1914*** 
(0.0520) 
-0.1632*** 
(0.0504) 
0.0067 
(0.0241) 
0.0006 
(0.0247) 
0.0214 
(0.0221) 
0.0056 
(0.0112) 
0.0057 
(0.0112) 
0.0056 
(0.0115) 
Domestic Credit t-1  
0.0091** 
(0.0044) 
0.0081** 
(0.0039) 
0.0108*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0034 
(0.0036) 
0.0020 
(0.0037) 
0.0055 
(0.0036) 
-0.0024 
(0.0041) 
-0.0032 
(0.0042) 
-0.0043 
(0.0043) 
M2 to Reserve t-1  
-0.0092 
(0.0179) 
-0.0087 
(0.0178) 
-0.0256 
(0.0199) 
-0.0396* 
(0.0239) 
-0.0284 
(0.0241) 
-0.0345 
(0.0228) 
0.0138*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0142 
(0.0043) 
0.0141*** 
(0.0043) 
Inflation t-1  
0.1237*** 
(0.0431) 
0.1275*** 
(0.0430) 
0.1191*** 
(0.0408) 
-0.0050** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0056** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0043** 
(0.0017) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0013 
(0.0004) 
0.0014*** 
(0.0004) 
Real Interest Rate t-1  
-0.0241*** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0233** 
(0.0093) 
-0.0192** 
(0.0087) 
0.0036 
(0.0089) 
0.0007 
(0.0093) 
-0.0001 
(0.0089) 
0.0051 
(0.0054) 
0.0054 
(0.0056) 
0.0069 
(0.0048) 
Covdep t-1 
-0.5625 
(0.5474)   
-1.4310*** 
(0.4886)   
0.7134 
(0.5561)   
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.3843** 
(0.1732)   
0.6667*** 
(0.1797)   
-0.0389 
(0.2265)   
Covgdp t-1  
-0.2341 
(0.6952)   
-0.5014 
(0.3947)   
1.3930 
(0.3954)  
(Covgdp × Covgdp) t-1  
0.2319 
(0.2009)   
0.3713** 
(0.1455)   
-0.2250 
(0.1859)  
Comp DI t-1   
-0.7593 
(0.6122   
0.1999 
(0.3461)   
2.0746*** 
(0.3756) 
(Comp DI×Comp DI) t-1   
0.3553*  
(0.2001   
0.0691 
(0.1105)   
-0.6546*** 
(0.1519) 
No. of observations 379 379 379 490 490 490 1114 1114 1114 
% correctly predicted 84.17% 84.17% 83.64% 74.69% 74.90% 74.08% 83.39% 83.21% 83.69% 
Wald Chi-Square  62.12 61.23 63.07 68.02 63.36 65.39 120.65 122.01 96.22 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.2555 0.2349 0.2298 0.1353 0.1206 0.1154 0.1238 0.1327 0.1268 
Log-Likelihood -130.78 -134.08 -134.98 -246.86 -251.06 -252.56 -456.77 -452.09 -449.14 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
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Table (8) The Probability of Systematic Banking Crises and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage 
 
Dependent Variable: Systemic Banking Crisis Dummy; Estimation Method: Logit Model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Countries Industrial and Emerging Market Countries 
Constant -2.0144*** (0.1549) 
-1.9735*** 
(0.1566) 
-1.9833*** 
(0.1564) 
-1.8725*** 
(0.3634) 
-1.7024*** 
(0.3533) 
-1.9590*** 
(0.3261) 
Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0090*** (0.0013) 
-0.0101*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0087*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0084*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0094*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.0079*** 
(0.0014) 
Real GDP Growth t-1  
-0.0861*** 
(0.0136) 
-0.0880*** 
(0.0141) 
-0.0915*** 
(0.0143) 
-0.1495*** 
(0.0273) 
-0.1584*** 
(0.0284) 
-0.1522*** 
(0.0277) 
CA to GDP t-1 
-0.0174** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0175** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0066 
(0.0084) 
-0.0501** 
(0.0254) 
-0.0607** 
(0.0258) 
-0.0369 
(0.0241) 
Domestic Credit t-1  
0.0073*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0063*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0065*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0165*** 
(0.0031) 
0.0148*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0175*** 
(0.0029) 
M2 to Reserve t-1  
0.0146*** 
(0.0041) 
0.0149*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0041) 
-0.0354* 
(0.0190) 
-0.0299 
(0.0190) 
-0.0591*** 
(0.0197) 
Inflation t-1  
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0007*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0037** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0039** 
(0.0016) 
-0.0029* 
(0.0015) 
Real Interest Rate t-1  
0.0072** 
(0.0037) 
0.0076** 
(0.0037) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0010 
(0.0060) 
0.0003 
(0.0062) 
0.0041 
(0.0064) 
Covdep t-1 
-0.9759*** 
(0.2871)   
-1.3195*** 
(0.3764)   
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.6001*** 
(0.1084)   
0.7010*** 
(0.1302)   
Covgdp t-1  
0.1724 
(0.2286)   
-0.4730 
(0.3458)  
(Covgdp × Covgdp) t-1  
0.2461*** 
(0.0818)   
0.4450*** 
(0.1113)  
Comp t-1   
-0.4045* 
(0.2075)   
-0.1603 
(0.3222) 
(Comp × Comp) t-1   
0.0206 
(0.0718)   
0.2392** 
(0.1099) 
No. of observations 1983 1983 1979 869 869 869 
% correctly predicted 85.93% 85.78% 85.70% 86.88% 86.54% 85.85% 
Wald Chi-Square  205.18 189.69 152.32 134.39 129.09 102.45 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1339 0.1262 0.0930 0.2118 0.1987 0.1626 
Log-Likelihood -720.79 -727.19 -747.85 -294.48 -299.37 -312.86 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
Table (9) The Onset of Banking Crises and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage  
Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis Dummy (excluding years during which the crisis is ongoing following the onset of the crisis) 
Estimation Method: Logit Model 
 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All Countries Industrial and Emerging Market Countries 
Constant -2.6462*** (0.2594) 
-2.6331*** 
(0.2563) 
-2.6332*** 
(0.2537) 
-1.8226*** 
(0.6005) 
-1.8186*** 
(0.5795) 
-1.8577*** 
(0.5357) 
Real GDP Per Capita  -0.0014 (0.0023) 
-0.0014 
(0.0024) 
-0.0012 
(0.0024) 
-0.0020 
(0.0023) 
-0.0018 
(0.0024) 
-0.0013 
(0.0023) 
Real GDP Growth t-1  
-0.0531** 
(0.0248) 
-0.0540** 
(0.0249) 
-0.0546** 
(0.0252) 
-0.0868* 
(0.0461) 
-0.0855* 
(0.0464) 
-0.0848* 
(0.0475) 
CA to GDP t-1 
0.0074 
(0.0119) 
0.0085 
(0.0124) 
0.0105 
(0.0124) 
-0.0986** 
(0.0445) 
-0.1024** 
(0.0454) 
-0.0998** 
(0.0452) 
Domestic Credit t-1  
-0.0023 
(0.0039) 
-0.0028 
(0.0039) 
-0.0030 
(0.0040) 
-0.0061 
(0.0073) 
-0.0071 
(0.0073) 
-0.0073 
(0.0070) 
M2 to Reserve t-1  
0.0132** 
(0.0053) 
0.0133** 
(0.0053) 
0.0132** 
(0.0053) 
0.0206 
(0.0220) 
0.0246 
(0.0218) 
0.0209 
(0.0229) 
Inflation t-1  
-0.0012 
(0.0010) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
-0.0011 
(0.0010) 
-0.0030 
(0.0022) 
-0.0030 
(0.0022) 
-0.0027 
(0.0021) 
Real Interest Rate t-1  
0.0045 
(0.0065) 
0.0053 
(0.0067) 
0.0055 
(0.0068) 
0.0022 
(0.0093) 
0.0023 
(0.0094) 
0.0033 
(0.0090) 
Covdep t-1 
-1.1060** 
(0.5237)   
-1.5410*** 
(0.5689)   
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.4268** 
(0.1882)   
0.5557*** 
(0.2039)   
Covgdp t-1  
-0.6168 
(0.4804)   
-1.1243** 
(0.5090)  
(Covgdp × Covgdp) t-1  
0.2352 
(0.1709)   
0.4022** 
(0.1720)  
Comp DI t-1   
-0.5664 
(0.3875)   
-0.9977** 
(0.4878) 
(Comp DI × Comp DI) t-1   
0.2026* 
(0.1220)   
0.3303** 
(0.1646) 
No. of observations 1666 1666 1666 713 713 713 
% correctly predicted 95.25% 95.26% 95.26% 94.11% 94.11% 94.11% 
Wald Chi-Square  23.53 20.56 21.17 24.20 19.83 18.36 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0051 0.0148 0.119 0.0040 0.0190 0.0312 
Pseudo R2 0.0303 0.0256 0.0254 0.0756 0.0670 0.0627 
Log-Likelihood -308.32 -309.80 -309.87 -147.60 -148.98 -149.66 
*, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
Table (10) The Credibility of Non-Insurance and the Role of Corrective Actions and Institutions (Industrial and Emerging Market Countries)† 
Table (10a) Dependent Variable: Banking Crisis dummy, Estimation Method: Logit Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Covdep t-1 
-1.0415*** 
(0.2894)
-0.9694*** 
(0.3067)
-1.3071*** 
(0.3223)
-0.9765*** 
(0.2906)
-1.3294*** 
(0.3059)      
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.6236*** 
(0.1034) 
0.5742*** 
(0.1045) 
0.5587*** 
(0.1325) 
0.4455*** 
(0.1358) 
0.6645*** 
(0.1391)      
Comp t-1      
-0.3600 
(0.2966) 
-0.2020 
(0.2961) 
-0.3823 
(0.2790) 
-0.3566 
(0.2701) 
-0.5154* 
(0.2751) 
(Comp × Comp) t-1      
0.3417*** 
(0.1215) 
0.3626*** 
(0.1116) 
0.3222** 
(0.1388) 
0.1680 
(0.1098) 
0.2838** 
(0.1201) 
(PCP × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1 
-0.0300*** 
(0.0117)          
(CAEI × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1  
-0.0071 
(0.0173)         
(Ospower× (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1   
0.0110 
(0.0122)        
(Law × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1    
0.0214 
(0.0183)       
(Corrupt × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1     
-0.0094 
(0.0192)      
(PCP × (Comp× Comp)) t-1      
-0.0275** 
(0.0127)     
(CAEI × (Comp× Comp)) t-1       
-0.0317* 
(0.0179)    
(Ospower× (Comp× Comp)) t-1        
-0.0044 
(0.0112)   
(Law × (Comp× Comp)) t-1         
0.0260 
(0.0176)  
(Corrupt × (Comp× Comp)) t-1          
0.0051 
(0.0203) 
PCP t-1 
0.2087*** 
(0.0447)     
0.1855*** 
(0.0463)     
CAEI t-1  
0.1684** 
(0.0755)     
0.2066** 
(0.0844)    
Ospower t-1   
0.0868** 
(0.0434)     
0.0810* 
(0.0473)   
Law t-1    
-0.0275 
(0.0924)     
-0.0474 
(0.0838)  
Corrupt t-1     
-0.2637** 
(0.1086)     
-0.2935*** 
(0.1066) 
No. of observations 852 836 826 869 869 852 836 826 869 869 
% correctly predicted 79.58% 79.43% 79.06% 79.06% 79.06% 78.87% 78.95% 78.21% 78.48% 78.48% 
Wald Chi-Square  124.92 109.81 114.75 117.82 114.23 94.54 85.36 85.40 94.07 93.47 
Prob > Chi-Square   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1511 0.1359 0.1388 0.1329 0.1430 0.1176 0.1069 0.1019 0.1023 0.1118 
Log-Likelihood -384.89 -386.13 -378.35 -404.36 -399.66 -400.09 -399.09 -394.59 -418.63 -414.23 
† Economic and Financial Variables are included in each regression, but not reported.  *, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
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Table (10b) Dependent Variable: NPLs, Estimation Method: OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Covdep t-1 
0.4355 
(1.2072) 
2.0567* 
(1.2272) 
1.1507 
(1.1335) 
-0.4275 
(1.4190) 
-0.2984 
(1.2198)      
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.1608 
(0.5510) 
0.5076 
(0.6191) 
1.4512* 
(0.8613) 
-0.1970 
(0.5410) 
0.0664 
(0.5369)      
Comp t-1      
-1.0467 
(1.0877) 
0.4094 
(1.1944) 
-0.8997 
(1.0937) 
-0.3094 
(1.5117) 
-1.1295 
(1.2453) 
(Comp × Comp) t-1      
0.5848 
(0.4626) 
0.6368 
(0.6059) 
-0.1065 
(0.9140) 
1.0010** 
(0.4725) 
0.1985 
(0.5141) 
(PCP × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1 
-0.0880 
(0.0620)          
(CAEI × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1  
-0.2337*** 
(0.0842)         
(Ospower× (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1   
-0.1544** 
(0.0672)        
(Law × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1    
0.1468 
(0.1185)       
(Corrupt × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1     
0.0188 
(0.1197)      
(PCP × (Comp× Comp)) t-1      
0.0156 
(0.0611)     
(CAEI × (Comp× Comp)) t-1       
-0.0704 
(0.1145)    
(Ospower× (Comp× Comp)) t-1        
0.0830 
(0.0726)   
(Law × (Comp× Comp)) t-1         
-0.1641 
(0.1517)  
(Corrupt × (Comp× Comp)) t-1          
0.1649 
(0.1232)
PCP t-1 
0.4375** 
(0.2158)     
0.1046 
(0.2343)     
CAEI t-1  
1.0466*** 
(0.2703)     
0.8243*** 
(0.4109)    
Ospower t-1   
0.2854 
(0.1946)     
-0.0755 
(0.2564)   
Law t-1    
-0.0073 
(0.6891)     
0.7705 
(0.5622)  
Corrupt t-1     
-1.8363*** 
(0.6077)     
-2.1722*** 
(0.6258)
No. of observations 287 282 276 293 293 287 282 276 293 293 
F-Statistics  32.85 53.69 50.40 41.53 34.43 34.16 56.90 44.37 43.02 31.45 
Prob > F-Statistics   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.4786 0.4908 0.4800 0.4712 0.4882 0.4892 0.5004 0.5033 0.4836 0.5032 
Root MSE 6.0366 5.7803 5.8964 6.5333 6.4279 5.9751 5.7258 5.7631 6.4565 6.3325 
† Economic and Financial Variables are included in each regression, but not reported.  *, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
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Table (10c) Dependent Variable: NPLs to Capital, Estimation Method: OLS 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Covdep t-1 -0.0768 (0.1242)
-0.0005 
(0.1140)
-0.0363 
(0.1140)
-11.3936 
(11.1486)
-8.5444 
(8.4111)      
(Covdep × Covdep) t-1 
0.0786 
(0.0551 
0.1206* 
(0.0616) 
0.1765** 
(0.0887) 
-0.3954 
(0.6490) 
0.2024 
(0.3378)      
Comp t-1      
-0.0579 
(0.0990) 
-0.0170 
(0.1088) 
-0.0907 
(0.1010) 
-10.6982 
(10.6830) 
-9.7672 
(9.7779) 
(Comp × Comp) t-1      
0.0542 
(0.0424) 
0.0791 
(0.0572) 
0.0534 
(0.0853) 
-0.4761 
(0.5959) 
-0.0950 
(0.2998) 
(PCP × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1 
-0.0143** 
(0.0062)          
(CAEI × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1  
-0.0254*** 
(0.0084)         
(Ospower× (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1   
-0.0140** 
(0.0065)        
(Law × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1    
0.8421 
(0.8374)       
(Corrupt × (Covdep × Covdep)) t-1     
0.6536 
(0.6783)      
(PCP × (Comp× Comp)) t-1      
-0.0062 
(0.0051)     
(CAEI × (Comp× Comp)) t-1       
-0.0119 
(0.0102)    
(Ospower× (Comp× Comp)) t-1        
0.0001 
(0.0065)   
(Law × (Comp× Comp)) t-1         
0.8074 
(0.8047)  
(Corrupt × (Comp× Comp)) t-1          
0.9103 
(0.9061)
PCP t-1 
0.0427* 
(0.0230)     
0.0239 
(0.0221)     
CAEI t-1  
0.0551** 
(0.0262)     
0.0450 
(0.0409)    
Ospower t-1   
0.0021 
(0.0216)     
-0.0173 
(0.0283)   
Law t-1    
-6.0684 
(6.0693     
-5.3568 
(5.3637)  
Corrupt t-1     
-5.4765 
(5.3503)     
-6.3325 
(6.1080) 
No. of observations 267 267 263 273 273 267 267 263 273 273 
F-Statistics  17.54 18.20 17.60 0.35 0.46 17.43 18.03 17.51 0.38 0.45 
Prob > F-Statistics   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9719 0.9274 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9622 0.9311 
R-Squared 0.3965 0.4025 0.4033 0.0414 0.0338 0.3936 0.3938 0.4020 0.0387 0.0386 
Root MSE 0.5209 0.5183 0.5212 29.3760 29.49 0.5222 0.5221 0.5218 29.4170 29.42 
† Economic and Financial Variables are included in each regression, but not reported.  *, **, *** indicate the significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The numbers in parentheses are robust 
standard errors of estimated coefficients.  
Figure 1 The Relationship Between the Market Discipline and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage 
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Figure 2a Explicit Coverage, Credibility of Non-Insurance, and Risk-Taking 
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Figure 3 Predicted Probability of Banking Crises and Explicit Deposit Insurance Coverage 
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  Figure 4 Predicted Probability of Banking Crises, Explicit Deposit Insurance and the Role of 
Corrective Actions & Institutions (Industrial and Emerging Market Countries) 
 
4a Explicit Deposit Insurance Variable: Coverage Limit Per Deposit Per Capita 
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4b Explicit Deposit Insurance Variable: Comprehensive Deposit Insurance 
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